本研究基于农产品物流金融服务平台,运用演化博弈理论构建了融通仓业务模式下物流企业与农产品中小企业之间的风险博弈模型,通过MATLAB软件对业务过程中信用风险、操作风险及质押物风险产生的关键影响因素进行数值仿真分析,提出相应的风险管理建议。研究表明:(1) 物流企业的业务监管成本与信用风险及操作风险大小呈负相关,物流企业应优化信息监管平台以降低业务监管成本。(2) 物流企业设定的业务违约罚金与信用风险及操作风险大小呈负相关,物流企业应完善违约处罚机制以提高业务违约成本。(3) 农产品质押物的市场价值变动对质押物风险及信用风险大小具有显著影响,物流企业应合理选择农产品质押物以降低质押物风险,而农产品中小企业应提升农产品质押物的品质以避免产生信用风险。(4) 农产品中小企业的声誉价值对信用风险大小具有一定影响,农产品中小企业应完善企业信用体系以提高自身声誉价值。Based on the agricultural product logistics financial service platform, this study uses evolutionary game theory to construct a risk game model between logistics companies and agricultural product SMEs under the financing warehouse business model. The key influencing factors of credit risk, operational risk and collateral risk in the business process are numerically simulated and analyzed by MATLAB software, and corresponding risk management suggestions are put forward. The research shows that: (1) The business supervision cost of logistics companies is negatively correlated with the size of credit risk and operational risk. Logistics companies should optimize the information supervision platform to reduce business supervision costs. (2) The business default penalty set by logistics companies is negatively correlated with the credit risk and operational risk. Logistics companies should improve the default penalty mechanism to increase the business
以冷链加工企业的融资困境为研究对象,构建由冷链加工企业、银行、第三方冷链物流企业、第四方物流(Forth Party Logistics,简称4PL)企业组成且第四方物流主导的冷链物流融通仓融资模式.针对融资需求,建立由银行和4PL提供融资服务的两种融通仓融资方式,通过Stackelberg博弈理论找寻在两种融资模式下冷链加工企业、银行、第三方冷链物流企业的最优决策.并运用数值仿真,分别从冷链加工企业、银行和第三方冷链物流企业的角度对比两种融资模式,为供应链各参与主体在融资模式中的优化决策提供参考.
构建融通仓第四方物流(fourth party logistics,4PL)动态激励模型。该模型根据委托-代理理论,考虑声誉效应的隐性激励因素,建立单一委托方与多个代理方关系的动态激励模型,并在模型求解结果的基础上进行算例分析。结果表明,第三方物流(third party logistics,3PL)的努力程度与声誉系数和4PL激励系数成正相关,与风险规避度成负相关;4PL的激励系数与声誉系数和风险规避度成负相关,引入声誉效应后3PL的努力程度提高,可以有效减少4PL激励成本。
